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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
John Michael Muguira appeals from the district court’s order denying his
motion for credit for time served.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged Muguira in Canyon County Case No. CR-2009-15664
(hereinafter “the Canyon County case”) with possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to deliver. (R., pp.31-32.) Muguira pled guilty, and the
district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, but
suspended the sentence and placed Muguira on probation for five years. (R.,
pp.57-67.) Muguira subsequently admitted to having violated his probation, and
the district court revoked his probation, executed his underlying sentence, and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.68-88, 127-28, 130-40, 148-50, 157-59.) After a
period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the balance of
Muguira’s sentence and reinstated him on probation for four years. (R., pp.16770.)
On June 12, 2012, just two months after Muguira had been reinstated on
probation, the state filed a petition for probation violation alleging Muguira had
violated his probation by (1) being arrested for felony driving under the influence
of alcohol (DUI) in Ada County on June 1, 2012; (2) leaving his assigned district
without permission; and (3) being under the influence of alcohol. (R., pp.17178.) The district court signed a warrant for Muguira’s arrest for the probation
violations, but the warrant was never served. (R., pp.184-87.)

1

As a result of his arrest in Ada County on June 1, 2012, Muguira was
charged in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2012-0008187 (hereinafter “the Ada
County case”) with felony DUI and misdemeanor driving without privileges.
(12/4/12 Judgment Of Conviction And Order Retaining Jurisdiction, filed in Ada
County Case No. CR-FE-2012-8187 (augmentation).) Muguira pled guilty to the
DUI charge, and the district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with
three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (Id.)
On May 2, 2013, while he was serving his period of retained jurisdiction in
the Ada County case, Muguira wrote a letter to the district court in the Canyon
County case. (5/2/13 Letter (augmentation).) In the letter, Muguira explained he
had been in custody on the Ada County DUI charge since June 1, 2012. (Id.)
He also represented that, although the state filed a petition for probation violation
in the Canyon County case on June 12, 2012, “the warrant was never active and
[he] was never served with it while [he] was in custody at the Ada County jail.”
(Id.) Muguira made similar representations in a pro se document entitled “Motion
And Affidavit In Support To Quash Warrant And Proceed With Disposition,”
which was filed in the Canyon County case on May 6, 2013. (R., pp.178-81.)
On October 4, 2013, the parties filed a stipulation to quash the warrant in
the

Canyon

County

case.

(10/4/13

Stipulation

To

Quash

Warrant

(augmentation).) The stipulation provided:
[The parties, through counsel of record,] hereby stipulate that the
warrant in the above-entitled case be quashed and that the
Defendant be summonsed to appear at an arraignment on the
pending Petition for Probation Violation. This stipulation is
based upon the fact that the Defendant has been placed upon
probation in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2011-0004346 and in
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Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2012-0008187 following his
successful completion of the Therapeutic Community Rider
program.
(Id.) The district court accepted the stipulation and entered an order quashing
the warrant and summonsing Muguira to appear for an arraignment on the
pending petition for probation violation.

(R., pp.182-83; see also R., p.184

(recalling “bench warrant issued on 6/12/2012”), pp.185-87 (notation “Quashed”
appears on face of arrest warrant signed by district court on June 12, 2012).)
On October 11, 2013, Muguira appeared, out of custody, at the
arraignment on the June 2012 petition for probation violation. (R., p.188.) At a
subsequent hearing, at which he also appeared out of custody, Muguira admitted
to having violated his probation as alleged in the June 2012 report of violation.
(R., pp.191-92.) The district court accepted Muguira’s admissions and reinstated
him on probation for four years. (R., pp.192-95.)
Less than a month later, the state filed another petition for probation
violation alleging Muguira had been charged with new crimes. (R., pp.196-218.)
Muguira admitted to having violated his probation, and on April 23, 2014, the
district court revoked his probation and ordered his underlying sentence
executed. (R., pp.234-36, 238-43.)
Approximately one year later, Muguira filed a pro se motion seeking credit
toward his Canyon County sentence for the time he served from June 1, 2012 –
the date of his arrest in the Ada County case – to October 4, 2013 – the date he
was released from custody in the Ada County case. (R., pp.244-58.) The district
court denied the motion.

(R., pp.259-61.) The court found that, although a
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petition for probation violation was filed in the Canyon County case on June 12,
2012, and a warrant issued on that date, there was “no evidence that [Muguira]
was ever served with the warrant, or that he was otherwise held on a functional
equivalent.” (R., pp.259-60.) The court also found there was “no evidence that
[Muguira] was in custody in the [Canyon County] case” and that “the time he
spent incarcerated and participating in the retained jurisdiction program” between
June 1, 2012 and October 4, 2013, was “attributable solely to the Ada County
case.” (R., p.260.)

Muguira timely appealed from the district court’s order

denying his motion for credit for time served. (R., pp.262-65, 273-76.)
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ISSUE
Muguira states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Muguira’s motion for
credit for time served?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Muguira failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion
for credit toward his Canyon County sentence for time he served exclusively in
relation to an Ada County case?

5

ARGUMENT
Muguira Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion For Credit For
Time Served
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Muguira’s motion for credit for time served, ruling

Muguira was not entitled to credit toward his Canyon County sentence for the
490 days he was incarcerated between June 1, 2012, and October 4, 2013,
because that incarceration was “attributable solely to the Ada County case.” (R.,
pp.259-60.)

Muguira challenges the district court’s ruling, contending he is

statutorily entitled to credit toward his Canyon County sentence for the time he
served following his arrest in Ada County because (1) the Ada County charge
formed the basis of the probation violation allegations in the Canyon County
case; and (2) although he was never served with it, “the arrest warrant for the
probation violation served as the functional equivalent of a bench warrant.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-15.) Correct application of the law to the facts of this
case shows neither argument has merit.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit

for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is
subject to free review by the appellate courts.” State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67,
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763,
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The construction and application of a statute
also presents a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free
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review. State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 306, 307, 142 P.3d 729, 730 (2006); State
v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003).
C.

Muguira Has Failed To Show Any Statutory Entitlement To Credit Toward
His Canyon County Sentence For The Time He Served In The Ada
County Case Before Being Held To Answer For The Probation Violation In
The Canyon County Case
Because “the best guide to legislative intent” is the words of the statute, the

interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words. State v. Doe, 147
Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). Where the statutory language is
unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law as written.
McLean v. Maverick County Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759
(2006).

Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only one

reasonable interpretation, it is the court’s duty to give the statute that
interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,
894-896, 265 P.3d 502, 507-509 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that
Court might not give effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was
“palpably absurd”).
The statutory provisions upon which Muguira bases his claim of
entitlement to credit for time served are I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-209A.1 Contrary

1

Both I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-209A were amended, effective July 1, 2015. See
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99, §§ 2 and 3. Because the amendments took
effect after the district court entered its April 23, 2014 order revoking Muguira’ s
probation and executing his sentence, all references herein to I.C. §§ 19-2603
and 20-209A are to the versions of the statutes as they existed at the time
Muguira’ s probation was finally revoked.
7

to Muguira’s arguments, an examination of the plain language of those statutes
shows Muguira is not entitled to the credit he seeks.
1.

Muguira Is Not Entitled Under I.C. § 19-2603 To Credit Toward
His Canyon County Sentence For Time He Served Exclusively
In Relation To The Ada County Case

Idaho Code § 19-2603 governs a defendant’s entitlement to credit for time
served upon execution of the defendant’s sentence following a probation
violation. At all times relevant to the trial court’s ruling on Muguira’s motion for
credit for time served, the statute provided:
Pronouncement and execution of judgment after
violation of probation. – When the defendant is brought before
the court in such case, it may, if judgment has been withheld,
pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced,
or, if judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, the
original judgment shall be in full force and effect and may be
executed according to law, and the time such person shall have
been at large under such suspended sentence shall not be counted
as a part of the term of his sentence, but the time of the
defendant’s sentence shall count from the date of service of such
bench warrant.
I.C. § 19-2603 (bolded emphasis original, italicized emphasis added). Pursuant
to the plain language of this statute, a defendant whose probation is revoked as
a result of a probation violation is only entitled to credit toward his sentence for
the time he served from the date of service of the bench warrant on the
violation(s). Id.; accord State v. Bitkoff, 157 Idaho 410, 413, 336 P.3d 817, 820
(Ct. App. 2014) (“Under the plain terms of I.C. § 19-2603, a defendant is entitled
to credit for time served from service of a bench warrant for a probation
violation.” (footnote omitted)); State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 398, 179 P.3d
360, 361 (Ct. App. 2008) (“credit must be given for jail incarceration after arrest
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for a probation violation” (emphasis omitted)); State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 127,
922 P.2d 419, 424 (Ct. App. 1996) (“Section 19-2603 provides that if a
probationer has been arrested and probation revoked as a result of a violation,
the defendant’s incarceration from the time of service of the bench warrant will
count as part of the sentence.” (footnote omitted)); State v. Lively, 131 Idaho
279, 280, 954 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Ct. App. 1998) (same).
In this case, it is undisputed that, after Muguira’s June 1, 2012 arrest for
driving under the influence of alcohol in the Ada County case, the state filed a
motion for probation violation in the Canyon County case. (R., pp.171-78.) A
bench warrant for the probation violation issued on June 12, 2012, but Muguira
was

never

served

with

the

warrant.

(R.,

pp.184-87;

5/2/13

Letter

(augmentation).) Muguira remained incarcerated in the Ada County case and
served a period of retained jurisdiction, after which he was released on
probation. (R., pp.246-52; 5/2/13 Letter (augmentation); 10/4/13 Stipulation To
Quash Warrant (augmentation).) Contemporaneously with his October 4, 2013
release on probation in the Ada County case, the parties in the Canyon County
case filed a stipulation to quash the Canyon County bench warrant, which the
district court granted.

(R., pp.182-87; 10/4/13 Stipulation To Quash Warrant

(augmentation); see also R, pp.246-52 (showing release from Ada County on
10/4/13).) Muguira was summonsed to appear for the Canyon County probation
violation proceedings, and he thereafter appeared out of custody at two
hearings, after which he was reinstated on probation. (R., pp.182-88, 191-95.)
Because the plain language of I.C. § 19-2603 only allows credit for time served
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from the date of service of the bench warrant for a probation violation, and
because Muguira was never served with the Canyon County bench warrant while
he was incarcerated on the Ada County charges (and, in fact, was released from
custody upon completion of his rider in the Ada County case), the district court
correctly concluded Muguira was not entitled to any credit toward his Canyon
County sentence for the 490 days he served between June 1, 2012 and October
4, 2013, because that incarceration was “attributable solely to the Ada County
case.” (R., p.260.)
Muguira argues otherwise. Specifically, he contends that, because he
was aware during his period of incarceration in the Ada County case that a
warrant for probation violation had been issued in the Canyon County case, and
because the Canyon County warrant identified Muguira’s last known address as
the “Ada County Jail,” his “arrest and incarceration on the Ada County DUI was
the functional equivalent of service of a bench warrant on the Canyon County
probation violation.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp.11-15.)

To support his position,

Muguira relies on Buys, supra. Muguira correctly notes that, in Buys, the Court
of Appeals held Buys was entitled to credit for time served pursuant to an “order
of incarceration” – entered by the district court before the issuance of any bench
warrant on Buys’ alleged probation violations – based on its determination that
the “order of incarceration” “appear[ed] to be the functional equivalent of a bench
warrant issued as a consequence of an alleged violation of probation terms.”
Buys, 129 Idaho at 127-28, 922 P.2d at 424-25.

Muguira’s reliance on the

rationale of Buys to establish his entitlement to credit for the 490 days he served
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in relation to the Ada County case before ever being held to answer for the
Canyon County probation violation allegations is unavailing for at least two
reasons.
First, the rationale of Buys – that a defendant is entitled to credit for time
served on orders that are the “functional equivalent” of a bench warrant – is
inconsistent with the unambiguous language of I.C. § 19-2603 that only permits
credit for time served from the date of service of the actual bench warrant.
Where, as here, the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court
must apply statute as written. Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96, 265 P.3d at 508-09
(disavowing cases with language that Court might not give effect to unambiguous
language of statute if such was “palpably absurd”). To the extent Buys holds
otherwise, it was wrongly decided in light of the Idaho Supreme Court’s later
opinion in Verska and should therefore be overruled. State v. Dana, 137 Idaho
6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002) (controlling precedent must be followed “unless it
is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or
unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and
remedy continued injustice”).
Second, the facts of Buys are easily distinguishable from the facts of this
case. Although Buys was not served with a bench warrant, he was actually
arrested and held for violating the conditions of his probation pursuant to a prewarrant “order of incarceration” issued in the case in which the probation
violation was filed. Buys, 129 Idaho at 124, 922 P.2d at 421. In this case,
Muguira was never arrested or otherwise held in custody as a result of the
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probation violation allegations filed in the Canyon County case. Muguira was
incarcerated on an Ada County DUI charge that gave rise to one of the Canyon
County probation violation allegations, but he was never in custody on the
probation violation allegations themselves, as evidenced both by the fact that the
bench warrant was never served and by the fact that the warrant was quashed
and Muguira was released from custody upon being placed on probation in the
Ada County case.
Relying on Idaho Criminal Rule 4(h)(3), Muguira argues he was
constructively served with the Canyon County warrant while incarcerated in the
Ada County case because he was aware the warrant had been issued and had
“discussed the … warrant with deputies at the Ada County Jail.” (Appellant’s
brief, pp.13-14.) Muguira’s argument is without merit. Although the state agrees
that I.C.R. 4(h)(3) “does not require [an] officer to physically hand a copy of the
warrant to the arrestee” (Appellant’s brief, p.13), Muguira’s claim that an officer
executes a warrant merely by telling the defendant about the warrant and then
showing it to him as soon as possible, without ever actually arresting the
defendant on the warrant, is nonsensical and contrary to the plain language of
the rule. Rule 4(h)(3) specifically provides that a “warrant shall be executed by
the arrest of the defendant.” That Muguira was already incarcerated in the Ada
County case when he found out about the Canyon County warrant and
“discussed” it with Ada County deputies does not show he was ever arrested on
the warrant. The warrant was never returned and, in fact, was quashed pursuant
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to the stipulation of the parties when Muguira was released on probation in the
Ada County case.
The plain language of I.C. § 19-2603 only allows credit for time served
from the date of service of the bench warrant for a probation violation. Muguira
was never served with a bench warrant in this case and was not otherwise in
custody as a result of his probation violations.

Accordingly, Muguira is not

entitled under the statute to credit toward his sentence for the 490 days he
served in the Ada County Cases before being held to answer for the probation
violation in this case.
2.

Muguira Is Not Entitled Under I.C. § 20-209A To Credit Toward
His Canyon County Sentence For Time He Served Exclusively
In Relation To The Ada County Case

Idaho Code § 20-209A governs entitlement to credit for time served both
before and after sentencing and, at all times relevant to the disposition of
Muguira’s motion, provided:
When a person is sentenced to the custody of the board of
correction, his term of confinement begins from the day of his
sentence. A person who is sentenced may receive credit toward
service of his sentence for time spent in physical custody pending
trial or sentencing, or appeal, if that detention was in connection
with the offense for which the sentence was imposed. …
I.C. § 20-209A (emphasis added). Relying both on the above italicized language
and on the Idaho Court of Appeals’ opinion in State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397,
179 P.3d 361 (Ct. App. 2008), Muguira argues he is entitled to credit toward his
Canyon County sentence for the 490 days he served in relation to the Ada
County case because the charge in the Ada County case formed the basis of the
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Canyon County probation violation allegations and because his sentences in the
two cases were ordered to run concurrently. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-11.) Neither
the plain language of I.C. § 20-209A nor the rationale of McCarthy support
Muguira’s argument.
The plain language of I.C. § 20-209A contemplates that a defendant
receive credit toward his sentence only for those periods of physical
custody/detention that were “in connection with the offense for which the
sentence was imposed.” In this case, there is no question that the probation
violation allegations in the Canyon County case stemmed at least in part from
the Ada County DUI charge. But, as set forth in detail in Section C.1., supra,
Muguira was never detained on the Canyon County probation violation
allegations; instead, his incarceration from June 1, 2012, to October 4, 2013,
was attributable solely to his arrest and conviction in the Ada County case.
Because Muguira was never detained “in connection with” the Canyon County
probation violations, he is not entitled under I.C. § 20-209A to credit toward his
Canyon County sentence for the time he served in relation to the Ada County
case.
Contrary to Muguira’s assertions, McCarthy, supra, does not compel a
different result. McCarthy was on probation for possession of methamphetamine
when he twice delivered methamphetamine to an undercover officer. McCarthy,
145 Idaho at 398, 179 P.3d at 361. McCarthy was arrested on a bench warrant
for a probation violation in the possession of methamphetamine case and, while
he was incarcerated, he was also served with an arrest warrant, issued in “a
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separate case arising from the same transactions with the undercover officer,”
for two counts of delivery of methamphetamine. Id. Citing I.C. § 18-309 and its
prior decisions that hold “a defendant is entitled to credit on all concurrent
sentences for prejudgment incarcerations simultaneously served in a single
county on separate crimes,” the Court of Appeals concluded “the same logic
require[d] credit on both of McCarthy’s sentences where his incarceration on a
probation violation in the possession case and on a new criminal charge in the
delivery case were based upon precisely the same conduct and concurrent
sentences [were] imposed.” McCarthy, 145 Idaho at 398-99, 179 P.3d at 361-62
(emphasis in original). The Court reasoned: “When it is the same acts that give
rise to both warrants for the defendant’s arrest and the confinement is served
simultaneously, it cannot be said that the incarceration is uniquely attributable to
either case individually.” Id. at 399, 179 P.3d at 362 (emphasis added).
Unlike McCarthy, who was served with arrest warrants both for the
probation violation in the possession of methamphetamine case and for the new
charges in the delivery case, Muguira was only arrested on the Ada County DUI
charge and was never served with an arrest warrant for the probation violations
in the Canyon County case.

Because Muguira was never served with the

Canyon County warrant while in incarcerated on the Ada County charge (or at
any point at all), Muguira was not serving simultaneous periods of confinement in
the two cases; instead, his incarceration between June 1, 2012, and October 4,
2013, was “uniquely attributable to” the Ada County case.
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For all of the reasons set forth above, Muguira has failed to show any
statutory entitlement to credit toward his Canyon County sentence for the 490
days he served in Ada County before being held to answer for the probation
violations in the Canyon County case. Having failed to do so, Muguira has failed
to show the district court erred in denying his motion for credit for time served.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order denying Muguira’s motion for credit for time served.
DATED this 5th day of April, 2016.
_/s/ Lori A. Fleming_____
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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